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Speculators and Price Volatility in Petroleum Markets
Abstract
The 1990s have been a decade of upheaval in international financial markets.  Much of
the responsibility for financial instability has been placed on speculators, particularly
hedge funds.  Speculative capital has been characterized as “hot money,” with capital
flows driven by “herding” and “contagion” among players in foreign-exchange, stock,
bond, and commodity markets.
Policies to deal with financial instability by weakening, or even disabling speculation,
have been based largely on anecdote, convenience (speculators have long served as
scapegoats for various problems), and ideology, rather than careful analysis.  Part of the
problem arises from the secrecy with which speculators operate.  Since speculative
trading cannot easily be observed, it is difficult to assess speculators’ contribution, if any,
to financial volatility.
This paper looks at speculative behavior in one of the largest, and most volatile,
international financial markets, petroleum derivatives.  It utilizes a large, detailed
database on individual trader positions in crude-oil and heating-oil futures markets.  The
paper is exploratory, focusing on measuring and assessing the tendency of speculators to
herd.
Two theories behind rational herding behavior are examined – the asymmetric
information view (poorly-informed traders make decisions based on observing well-
informed traders, rather than market fundamentals) and the monitoring/incentive view
(institutional investors make decisions knowing that their incentives are based on
performance relative to a benchmark such as mean returns for a group).  These theories
generate different predictions regarding the types of speculators most likely to herd.
The evidence does not support the view that herding among speculators as a group is
widespread in this market.  In contrast, evidence in favor of a moderate degree of herding
among one group of speculators, commodity-fund managers. the evidence is supportive
of the monitoring/incentive theory, but not the asymmetric-information theory.…I explained to you the instability of [stock] prices
and the reasons therefore…and discussed the
frenzy and foolishness of speculation. …As there are
so many people who cannot wait to follow the
prevailing trend of opinion, …they think only of doing
what others do and following their examples...
-- excerpted from de la Vega [1688]
I. Introduction
The past few years have witnessed the worst turmoil in the international financial system
in the post-War era. The “Tequila Crisis” of the mid 1990s was followed by the “Asian
Crisis” and the “Russian Crisis” of the late 1990s.  Views about the causes of financial
turmoil, as well as proposed solutions, are numerous.  One perspective focuses on
“fundamentals” --  alleged weaknesses in social, political, and economic systems.  An
alternative view is that crises are generated by the financial system itself, arising from
“speculative excess,” “contagion,” or “herding” – all terms that suggest that the
underlying fundamentals are basically sound. In this view, speculators “panicked,”
reacting to bad news in one market by pulling their funds out of other markets in
geographic or economic proximity.
1
This paper focuses on the second perspective, seeking to assess speculators’ role in
                                                                
1
Sanger [1998] is an example from the popular press.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  2
financial turmoil.  If speculators indeed exacerbate (or even cause) financial instability,
then society would benefit from policy measures restricting their activity.  Such measures
are many and varied, ranging from the “Tobin Tax” on speculative activity proposed by
Nobel-prize winner James Tobin, to stricter government regulation, to closing down
markets entirely.  The objective is to “throw sand in the wheels of international finance”
(Eichengreen et al [1995], Haq et al [1996]).  Conversely, if speculation serves to
mitigate volatility, then trading should be encouraged.
Researchers, however, face substantial challenges in testing theories that view speculators
as necessary to the functioning of the international financial system against those that see
them as unnecessary at best, and destructive at worst.  These challenges are of two types.
First, most speculative behavior goes unseen -- neither policymakers nor researchers are
typically privy to information regarding speculator decisions and actions, which are
private. Only the consequences of speculator behavior are observable.
Second, many such consequences can be explained equally well by theories that assume
that speculators are responsible for market turmoil, and by those based solely on
fundamentals.  For example, Thailand’s problems may have precipitated the Asian crisis
through economic linkages of trade and investment with its neighbors, rather than
through the contagion widely described as behind the crisis. Consequently, there is little
hard evidence on either speculators’ actions or their consequences, leaving policy to be
made on the basis of anecdotes and ideology.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  3
As exemplified in the quotation above, controversy over the behavior of speculators in
financial markets goes back to the early days of trading.  Claims that self-interested
speculative behavior is detrimental (to markets for the underlying commodity) fall into
three categories.
2
First, speculators engage in “positive feedback trading,” entering markets when
fundamentals are strengthening (thus driving prices up even higher), and bailing out
when they weaken, putting further downward pressure on prices.  Such behavior can
drive prices away from fundamental values, a process sometimes referred to as a
“bubble” in the modern finance literature.
3
  Second, speculators manipulate the market.
4
Third, speculators trade by watching each other, rather than market fundamentals, a
phenomenon referred to as “herding.” When each speculator rushes to buy what others
are buying and sell when others are selling, the resulting “stampede” can exacerbate
volatility arising from shocks to supply and demand.  Because of the current interest in
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 Any trader with enough capital can affect a market by building up a large enough position, but in general such
positions cannot be liquidated profitably.  Speculative behavior detrimental ex ante to a trader’s own self-interest is
not discussed here.
3
 For a discussion of bubbles, see the symposium in the Spring 1990 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives,
especially Flood and Hodrick [1990].
4
 “Manipulation” here refers to 1) traders with market power affecting prices by spreading false news regarding their
intentions or behavior, 2) traders with inside information about market fundamentals making false announcements
regarding factors likely to affect market fundamentals, 3) traders buying up the stock of the commodity in inelastic
supply, and reselling it at a monopoly profit (e.g., the Salomon brothers Treasury Bond corner of 1991; see Jordan
and Jordan [1996]), or 4) delivery squeezes, wherein traders accumulate larger forward positions than the available
supply of the cash commodity, and demand delivery.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  4
herding, this last phenomenon provides the focus of this paper.
II. Herding
Herding is a widespread social phenomenon (e.g., buying books because they are on best-
seller lists), and the past decade has seen considerable progress in the development of
theoretical models of herding behavior, both in general and in financial markets in
particular.
5
  The finance literature has developed two hypotheses regarding types of
traders mostly likely to engage in herding behavior.  These hypotheses generate different
predictions, allowing us to construct tests that can distinguish between them.
The information-asymmetry hypothesis views herding as rational behavior by relatively
poorly-informed traders, who watch their better-informed brethren, and attempt to take
similar positions, or follow similar trading strategies based on past public information
(e.g., trend extrapolation).
6
  If this hypothesis is true, then the “smart money” – often
identified with institutional investors -- is least likely to herd, because of greater (or
faster, or more accurate) access to information and capability for analysis of its price
implications. Individual investors are more likely to herd,
7
 especially those physically
                                                                
5
 See Devenow and Welch [1996] for a survey of the literature.
6
 In this context, “rational” in the sense that it leads to higher expected returns for poorly-informed traders than
acting on their own information.  “Poorly informed” refers to the condition wherein some market participants have
access to information regarding changes in market fundamentals more rapidly or cheaply than others.
7
 As an example from the trade press, Briese [1994, p.38] observes that “…some market books recommend
following the large speculators under the theory that they must be pretty good traders to get that large.”  He alsoSHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  5
present on the floor of the exchange, who can most readily observe the behavior of other
traders.  The few papers in the herding literature (discussed below) have not been able to
examine the trading behavior of this group of individual investors.
In contrast, the monitoring/incentive hypothesis predicts that institutional investors are
the group most likely to herd.  Institutional investors are subject to industry
benchmarking – e.g., fund managers’ assessment and incentives are typically based on
their performance relative to other managers – and will thus try to avoid standing out
from the herd [Scharfstein and Stein 1990].  An effective way to do so is to buy what
other fund managers are buying, etc.
Of course, these two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. institutional investors and
individuals can be herding amongst themselves at the same time, but for different
reasons.  Similarly, neither group need be herding.  These possibilities are examined in
the empirical section below.
Empirical analysis, however, has been limited to a few recent papers.  Analysis of
herding requires disaggregated (investor-level) data; typically, the only such data
available are those collected by governments in the course of financial regulation.  With
one exception, the few studies in this area [Lakonishok et al 1992, Choe, Kho and Stulz
1999, Kim and Wei 1999, Wermers 1999] analyze decisions to buy and sell stocks by
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
notes the counterargument that “the growth of these funds (the large speculators) can be attributed more to a knackSHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  6
mutual-fund and pension-fund managers.
The limitations of studies based on fund managers’ security investments are of two types.
First, in the case of U.S. stock markets, funds are required to report their holdings on a
quarterly basis, which may work well for investor protection, but creates problems for
research.
8
  For example, if one fund dumps its foreign stock in late April, and another
does the same in mid-June, the concept of “herding” is severely stretched, probably
beyond the concept of imitative behavior that causes concern.
9
Even apart from the time-horizon, this type of data does not allow researchers to
distinguish herding from actions based on changes in political or economic
“fundamentals;” i.e., developments in the real side of the economy. Continuing the
example above, if the two pension fund managers see their overseas investments faring
poorly, they may decide to invest elsewhere.  They might not even know of decisions by
others to do likewise, much less be trying to follow the herd.
The one article comprising the exception [Kodres and Pritsker 1996] analyzes data
collected by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) on the daily
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
for fundraising than trading.”
8
 The underlying data are collected under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment
Company Act of 1940, which regulate mutual and pension funds.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  7
positions of large players in options and futures markets.
10
  The authors studied the
behavior of financial institutions in foreign-exchange, eurocurrency, and other financial
markets during the period 1992-1994, but were not able to get around the second
problem.  They thus could not ascertain whether the tendency of some financial
institutions to act similarly was due to herding or parallel response to new public
information.
11
This paper takes advantage of a similar CFTC database, covering the period 1993-1997
for a particularly important, simple, and volatile international commodity market,
petroleum.  Petroleum provides an ideal natural laboratory for analyzing speculative
behavior, for several reasons.  First, it accounts for the single largest good moving in
international trade, comprising 10 to 25 percent of the value of world trade (depending on
oil prices).
Second, the bulk of derivatives trading in the oil market takes place on commodity
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
9
 In the case of the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE), such reporting is monthly [Kim and Wei 1999].  Choe, Kho, and
Stulz [1999] analyze daily data on purchases and sales on the KSE, but cannot distinguish traders, making
interpretation of herding measures problematic.
10
 In addition, a few studies have examined the behavior of a single speculator, or the accounts of a single brokerage
house; the generality of their results is difficult to assess.  Jordan and Meiselman [1996] provide a survey.
11
 It should be noted that doubts have been raised regarding the relevance of information asymmetry in commodity
markets, where private information is assumed to be less important than in equity markets.  Ito et al [1998] find
evidence of information asymmetry in the foreign-exchange (FX) market, showing that the end of restrictions on
lunch-hour FX trading in Tokyo in 1994 was associated with higher variance of the ¥/$ exchange rate, despite the
unchanged flow of public information. Manaster and Mann [1996] find evidence of information asymmetry among
market-makers trading futures contracts in the pits of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.  Evidence supporting suchSHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  8
exchanges, in contrast to derivatives of financial instruments (e.g., interest rates and
exchange rates), where the over-the-counter (OTC) market dominates trading, making it
more difficult to draw general conclusions regarding speculative behavior from futures
data.
12
Third, the oil market has long been volatile.  Speculators have been blamed for
exacerbating “energy crises,” and proposals have been made to curtail their activity (see
Weiner [1998], and references therein).  A recent series of articles in the trade press have
related speculative activity to price fluctuations in petroleum markets.
13
  Utilizing CFTC
Commitments of Traders (COT) data (described below), they demonstrate a strong
correlation between aggregate non-commercial net open interest and oil prices.
The focus of these articles is on well-capitalized speculators (“funds”) – commodity
pools and hedge funds – and whether these funds have a positive or negative effect on
market volatility.  If the funds can be characterized as “smart money,” undertaking
extensive analysis on possible changes in future industry, macroeconomic, political, etc.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
information asymmetry in the over-the-counter (OTC) petroleum forward market can be found in Phillips and
Weiner [1994].
12
 Roughly 99 percent of FX derivatives trading is OTC -- $990 billion out of $1002 billion per day in April 1998
[Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 1999].  While no organization surveys OTC activity in petroleum, BIS
[1999, Table E-41] estimates $250 billion notional value outstanding in OTC contracts  in commodities other than
precious metals as of June 1998 (metals and petroleum account for about 98 percent  of OTC activity in
commodities [World Bank, 1999]).  If the ratio of OTC trading activity to notional outstandings is the same for
commodity contracts as for interest-rate contracts, daily OTC non-precious-metal commodity turnover would be
about $1.4 billion.  Daily turnover in NYMEX oil and gas futures contracts alone was about $2.5 billion in June
1998.  Adding turnover in NYMEX options contracts and IPE futures and options would increase the disparity still
further.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  9
conditions and their likely consequences for prices, their presence would help smooth
market adjustment to these changes. In contrast, if funds represent “dumb money” –
herding sheep, buying and selling because others are doing so, or noise traders chasing
price trends, they would tend to exacerbate volatility.
The articles in the trade press tend to view the funds’ behavior as volatility-increasing.
14
Trade-press accounts are not always coherent, however; e.g., Dale and Zyren [1996]
claim that aggregate data show that funds are price followers (termed “sheep” by PIW
[1995]) rather than an influence on prices.  Even if their analysis showed such to be the
case (which it does not, as pointed out by Krapels [1996], who notes “occasionally there
is a wolf under that wool”), their reassuring interpretation (that funds should not be a
policy concern because they are price followers, rather than price leaders) is the opposite
of the one suggested by economic theory.  If these be sheep, then one is safer among
wolves!
Finally, using petroleum allows us to get around the problem noted above –
distinguishing herding from parallel responses to news regarding fundamentals.  Doing so
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
13
 See especially Arnold [1995], Dale and Zyren [1996], Keefe [1996], Krapels [1996, 1999], Petroleum Intelligence
Weekly [1995], and Verleger [1995].
14
 For example, Krapels [1999], who claims, “The cost [of speculation in futures markets], as the academic literature
has begun to recognize but as practitioners in financial markets have long known in their bones, is volatility;” and
“Of the hundreds of fund managers and commodity traders, the vast majority are ‘systems traders,’ relying upon the
analysis of price trends for their trading decisions, and paying little if any attention to the fundamentals of the
markets in which they are trading.”SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  10
requires that the scholarly literature have a good handle on these fundamentals, which is




The Commitments of Traders (COT) data consists of the open (i.e., end-of-trading-day)
positions of large players in options and futures markets, and is collected by the CFTC,
which regulates options and futures trading on commodity exchanges in the United
States.  While the trade press and forecasters have begun to focus on COT data only in
the past few years,
15
 the large-trader reporting requirements date back to the Grain
Futures Act of 1922.
16
As part of its market surveillance function, the CFTC requires large traders to report their
open positions on a daily basis.
17
  The term “large” refers to the size of a trader’s open
positions in a given contract, and varies across commodities – 150 contracts in the case of
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 Examples from the futures-industry trade press include Briese [1994], Krapels [1996], and Cavaleti [1996].
Examples from the petroleum-industry trade press include Arnold [1995], Verleger [1995], and Keefe [1996].
16
 The Act required traders in grain futures to report large positions to the exchanges on which they traded; these
reports were then passed on to the Grain Futures Administration, part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  The
current system, whereby large traders and their brokers must report directly to the regulatory authority, was
established under the Commodity Exchange Act.  Regulation of futures markets, including large-trader reporting
requirements, was extended beyond agricultural commodities in 1974, when the CFTC was created.  McDonnell and
Freund [1983] provide a historical and legal account.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  11
gasoline, 250 in the case of heating oil, 300 in the case of crude oil.
18
The COT data classify reporting market participants into categories (individual trader
identities are blinded for confidentiality).  Participants are deemed to be “commercial” if
they are active in cash markets for the given commodity, and “noncommercial”
otherwise.
19
  Noncommercials are the group usually identified as speculators; their
behavior often attracts considerable scrutiny.
Use of aggregate COT data for analysis of speculator performance dates back at least as
far as Houthakker [1957], who examined month-end position data for wheat, corn, and
cotton for the period 1937-1952.
20
   A few researchers have had access to the underlying
daily position data, disaggregated by individual trader, but with the exception of the study
discussed above by Kodres and Pritsker [1996] (who did not look at speculator behavior),
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 Thus the COT data cannot be used to examine intraday trader behavior.
18
 The reporting threshold is designed to capture about two-thirds of a contract’s open interest; for example, during
the period covered by our database, large traders in heating-oil futures accounted for an average of 66 percent of the
long open interest, and 77 percent of the short open interest [Ederington and Lee 1998].
19
 It should be noted that the commercial group includes financial institutions that may hedge on customers’ behalf,
as well as laying off some of their own exposure to oil prices arising from writing OTC contracts such as swaps and
options.
20
 Aggregate COT data are released biweekly by the CFTC.  For a survey of research on speculator performance in
futures markets (through analysis of COT and other data), see Jordan and Meiselman [1996].  The sole published
article on trader performance in petroleum markets analyzes individual transactions in the OTC forward market in
Brent blend crude oil [Phillips and Weiner 1994].SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  12
none has examined herding.
21
The database examined here covers the three widely traded NYMEX petroleum contracts
– sweet crude oil, heating oil, and New York Harbor gasoline -- and  was made available
by the CFTC as part of a U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) study on the effects of
speculation on heating-oil markets.
22
  These contracts accounted for over 99 percent of
petroleum trading on the exchange during the 46-month period (963 trading days)
covered by the database, June 1993 through March 1997. Trading volume averaged
roughly 25 million contracts per year for crude oil, and 7-8 million contracts for heating
oil and gasoline (see Table 1).
{insert Table 1 about here}
In this paper, I examine the crude oil contract, and one of the smaller contracts, heating
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 Hartzmark [1987,1991] used disaggregated data to examine trading profitability in nine agricultural and financial
futures contracts over the period 1977-1981.  Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu [1994] repeated Hartzmark’s study for pork-
belly futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange over the period 1982-1990.  Chang, Pinegar, and Schacter
[1997] used COT position data to infer trading volume by large speculators, and related it to price volatility in five
agricultural and financial futures markets.
22
 The database contains roughly 1.25 million records, each corresponding to an open position in a single contract
and maturity for a single reporting trader on a single day.  For the purpose of this paper, open positions were
aggregated over maturities (e.g., open positions in the January, February, March, etc. heating-oil futures contracts
were combined for each trader each day).  Ederington and Lee [1998] provide further details.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  13
oil, where the unusual behavior by speculators was alleged to have occurred.
23
  During
this time period, there were 1308 large traders (380 commercial, 928 noncommercial)
active in NYMEX crude oil contracts, and 700 (277 commercial, 423 noncommercial)
active in the heating oil contracts.  The great majority of the large traders active in crude
oil (which has almost three times more trading volume and open interest) were active in
heating oil as well.
24
The CFTC database breaks down noncommercial positions as follows.  CPOs
(commodity-pool operators) are the equivalent of mutual funds in the securities industry
– firms that collect customer funds and use them to invest in futures and options markets.
CTAs (commodity trading advisors) are firms that advise investors (both individuals
and CPOs) on trading decisions, or make such decisions on their clients’ behalf.
FCMs (futures commission merchants) are the equivalent of stockbrokers — firms that
accept customer funds and orders to buy and sell futures and options.  IBs (introducing
brokers) are firms that accept customer orders, but do not accept funds, instead acting as
intermediary between customers and FCMs.  APs (associated persons) are individuals
                                                                
23
 In response to pressure from USDOE over heating-oil price increases, the chairman of Amerada Hess pointed to
speculators as responsible [Sullivan 1996, Turner 1996].  The USDOE study was undertaken in response to these
claims.
24
 Recall that “active” here refers to end-of-day open positions exceeding the CFTC’s reporting threshold, need not
be related to volume traded.  To be in the database, a trader must have carried an open position in at least one day
during the period covered.  Studies of futures markets utilizing individual-trade data indicate that locals account for
a large percentage of total trades [Manaster and Mann 1996].SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  14
who work for firms in the futures industry -- FCMs, IBs, CPOs, or CTAs.
FBs and FTs (floor brokers and floor traders) are “locals” – members of the exchange
or seat lessors who execute trades on the floor; the former transact for customers (some
for their own accounts as well), the latter only for themselves.
25
The above groups must register with the CFTC, and are subject to oversight by the
National Futures Association, the self-regulatory body of the U.S. futures industry.  In
contrast, Hedge Funds are private investment vehicles (typically limited partnerships),
and under certain conditions may be able to avoid regulatory requirements regarding
registration, record maintenance, and disclosure.
26
  Managed Money refers to managers
of funds broader than commodity pools. Undesignated traders are (unregulated) off-
floor individuals or firms transacting for their own accounts, designated as “customers”
below.
In order for a position to be classified in the database as belonging to a CTA, FB, FCM,
or IB, it must be a “house account;” trades executed for customers are classified by
customer type.  Table 2 provides a breakdown on the number of noncommercial traders
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 The term “local” is often restricted to those who trade solely for their own account.
26
 These conditions pertain to whether the hedge fund is registered in the USA, is marketed to US investors, is
marketed only to “qualified eligible participants,” and the extent of the fund’s activities in markets regulated by the
CFTC.  See International Monetary Fund [1998], Fung and Hsieh [1999] for details.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  15
by registration type.
{insert Table 2 about here}
B. Herding Measures
The essence of herding behavior is traders changing their positions in the same direction.
As noted above, the tendency of traders to move in the same direction at the same time is
a necessary, but not sufficient condition for herding, because such parallel movements
may be reactions to changes in common information sets.  The simplest measures for
capturing the tendency of traders to buy or sell when others are doing likewise are a)
counts of traders buying and selling at the same time, and b) correlation across traders of
changes in open position.
Of course, as in all derivatives markets, the futures contracts outstanding at any time must
sum to zero – for every short, there must be a long, and it is not possible for the market as
a whole to change position.  Instead I  examine the tendency to herd of the trader types
discussed above.
1. Counts of Buyers and Sellers
Under the null hypotheses of no herding, the number of speculators buying (denoted B
below) and selling (S) each day should be equal, and deviations from equality due to
chance.  Table 3 provides summary statistics on counts of speculator activity.  The dailySHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  16
median (and mean) number of large speculators’ changing position
27
 in crude-oil futures
is 28, with a maximum of 50, and minimum of 10.  Analogous figures for heating-oil
futures are median of 17 large speculators active, with a maximum of 42, and minimum
of 3.
28
On none of the 962 trading days (one observation is lost in calculating daily position
changes) in the period were all of the large noncommercial players on the same side of
the market.
29
 The mean percentage buying was 48.7 percent in crude oil, 50.3 percent in
heating oil.
{insert Table 3 about here}
The count measure used in the small herding literature on mutual fund managers’ stock
selections (Lakonishok et al [1992], Choe et al [1999], Wermers [1999]) is the absolute
difference each day between the fraction of speculators buying and 50 percent (so that
everyone selling and no one selling yield the same value), less an adjustment factor.  The
                                                                
27
 In the absence of transaction data it is impossible to know the number of large speculators active in the markets
each day.  The number changing position represents a lower bound, and is referred to as the number “active” below.
28
Low numbers often correspond to holiday periods; e.g., on 3 July 1995, a Monday prior to the U.S. Independence
Day holiday, only 3 large speculators were active in heating-oil futures, and 10 in crude-oil futures.
29
 The days with the lowest percentage of large speculators buying were 26 July 1994 in crude-oil futures (3 of 23
active, or 13 percent), and 19 September 1996 in heating-oil futures (1 of 14 active, or 7 percent).  The highest
percentages of large speculators buying were recorded on 6 August 1993 in crude-oil futures (17 of 20, or 85
percent), and 27 January 1997 for heating-oil futures (15 of 17, or 88 percent).SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  17
adjustment factor (here labeled m) reflects the fact that even under the null hypothesis, the
expected value of an absolute difference is positive.
H = |B/(B+S) - 0.5| - m
m = E[|B/(B+S) – 0.5| no herding]
Under the null hypothesis of no herding, m is readily calculated, as the sample fraction
buying B/(B+S) has a binomial distribution with probability of success 0.5 and number of
trials = B+S.  The adjustment factor declines with sample size, ranging here from 5.6
percent (sample size 50) to 25 percent (sample size 3).
Table 4 presents summary statistics on H for three groups of speculators – all
noncommercials, CPOs, and floor brokers and traders.  When all noncommercials are
taken together, there is little indication of parallel movement in open positions in either
crude-oil or heating-oil futures; as shown in the first and fourth columns of the table, the
mean value of H is only 1.20 percent in the former, and 0.86 percent in the latter.  The
standard deviations are also small, though, and the herding estimates are statistically
positive at conventional significance levels, although economically small.
{insert Table 4 about here}
The distribution of H is skewed, however, with large positive values possible, but large
negative values bounded by the size of the adjustment factor.  In crude oil, for example,SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  18
the maximum value of H is 28.6 percent, and the minimum value, -10.5 percent.  While
the mean values of the herding measure are positive in both markets, both markets exhibit
positive skewness, and the median values are both negative (–0.06 percent in crude oil,
-0.47 percent in heating oil).
In the crude-oil market, 496 of the 962 trading days (51.6 percent) had a negative value
of H, indicating that the fraction of noncommercial traders on the same side of the market
was actually closer to 50 percent than would be expected by chance.  This was even more
the case in heating oil, where H was negative on 505 of the 962 trading days (52.5
percent).
30
These results are in contrast to Choe et al [1999] (the only study to test on daily data),
who found evidence of substantial herding by foreign investors in the Korean stock
market (but recall caveat in footnote 9 above), and Wermers [1999], who found moderate
herding (over calendar quarters) among U. S. mutual fund managers.
It may be the case that speculators are simply too heterogeneous for herding to be an
important phenomenon for the group as a whole.  To explore this possibility, herding
statistics were calculated separately for CPOs and floor participants (FBs and FTs);
estimates are reported in Table 4.  These traders are predicted to be the most-likelySHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  19
herding candidates by the theories discussed above.
As managers of commodity funds, CPOs tend to be in the futures markets regularly,
move investments among commodities, and be subject to similar performance
assessments, making them good a priori herding candidates according to the
monitoring/incentive theory.   Moreover, the trade press characterizes most CPOs as
technical traders – buying and selling futures contracts based on recent price movements,
rather than analysis of likely developments in fundamentals.  As long as technical-trading
rules are similar across CPOs, they would tend to buy and sell at the same time.
31
Empirical research based on aggregate data from a variety of futures markets indicates
that these technical systems indeed generate similar trading strategies, and that as a group
CPOs tend to be positive-feedback traders, buying after price increases, and selling after
declines [Irwin and Yoshimaru 1999].
32
Floor participants (brokers and traders) are likely herding candidates according to the
asymmetric-information theory, both because they can watch each other far more readily
than other market participants, and because their full-time occupation as traders in the
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 The p-values (i.e., likelihood of getting at least this many negative values under the null hypothesis that the values
of H are drawn from a population with median zero) are 17.5 percent for crude oil, and 6.5 percent for heating oil.
31
 The majority of CTAs, who advise or make investments for commodity pools, describe their trading strategies as
“trend following” [Fung and Hsieh 1999].  See also Kolb [1997, p.105] and footnote 14 above.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  20
exchange pits may make it difficult for them to keep up with and assess the impact of
information flowing into the market.
33
For each group, two separate assumptions were made about the likelihood of an active
speculator being a buyer on a given day under the null hypothesis of no herding.  First,
the likelihood was assumed to be 50 percent, as above.  Second, the likelihood was
allowed to differ each day, in accordance with the sign patterns of changes in open
position of noncommercials as a group, excluding the subgroup examined.   For example,
if 40 percent of non-CPO speculators were purchasers on a given day, then it was
assumed that in the absence of herding, 40 percent of CPOs would be purchasers that day
as well.
The justifications for the second assumption are two.  First, news arriving in the market
may elicit changes in net position for speculators as a group that are unrelated to herding
behavior.  For example, information that suggests an increase in price volatility (due to
changes in fundamentals, e.g., an unexpected decline in inventory levels) may lead
speculators as a group to reduce the size of their open interest.  If speculators happen to
be net long at the time, then fewer should buy than sell that day; the (<50) percentage
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 These results are based on data collected in a CFTC pilot program covering December 1988 through March 1989.
The briefness of the sample period, as well as the enormous increase in fund activity in the ensuing decade raise
questions about their current relevance.
33
 The problem of market-maker strategy when facing traders with potentially-superior information is at the heart of
asymmetric-information models developed for equity markets (see, e.g., the textbook by O’Hara [1995]).SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  21
buying provides a benchmark for the day.  Second, the second assumption is employed in
the few studies in the literature, and thus allows for a direct comparison with their results.
The results for CPOs differ significantly from those of noncommercials as a group,
regardless of which assumption is made regarding the daily benchmark for percentage
buying.  As seen in Table 4, mean (respectively, median) herding measures in crude oil
were about 3 (respectively, 1) percentage points higher than would be expected by chance
for the 50 percent benchmark, and about 5 (respectively, 3) percentage points higher than
would be expected by chance for the benchmark used in the literature.
Moreover, CPO herding tendencies are stronger for heating oil than for crude oil.  Mean
(respectively, median) herding measures in heating oil were about 4 (respectively, 3)
percentage points higher than would be expected by chance for the 50 percent
benchmark, and about 8 (respectively, 6) percentage points higher than would be
expected by chance for the benchmark used in the literature.
34
Results for floor participants are weaker.  Mean herding measures are small (<2 percent
in both markets) when the 50 percent benchmark is used, large (>5 percent in both
markets) when the literature benchmark is used.  Median herding measures are negative
                                                                
34
 The p-value for the means and medians differing from zero are well below 1 percent in both markets, under both
benchmark assumptions. The herding measure is positive on 468 of the 851 days (55 percent) in which there were at
least two large CPOs active in the market using the 50 percent benchmark.  The analogous figure using the literature
benchmark is 517 positives out of the 851 days (61 percent).SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  22
(and statistically insignificant from zero at conventional levels) under the first
benchmark, but large under the second benchmark.
The stronger results for CPOs should be viewed in the context of the relative small
number active in the markets each day, however.  As seen in Table 3 above, a mean and
median of only 7 large CPOs are active IN   crude oil, compared to about 12 floor traders,
and 28 total.  Corresponding figures IN   heating oil are even smaller – 4 CPOs and 9
floor traders out of 17 total.
2. Correlations
The count measures examined above have the advantage of being nonparametric, and
hence not relying on distributional assumptions about trader position changes.  Such tests
may not be very powerful, however, in part because they do not take advantage of
potentially important information – the size of trader position changes – instead relying
only on the sign of these changes.
In contrast, the most widely used measure of tendency toward parallel behavior,
correlation, assumes position changes are normally distributed.  I start by estimating
correlations for commercial traders.  While this paper focuses on speculator behavior, it
is useful to examine the behavior of commercial participants as a benchmark against
which to compare position changes by noncommercials.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  23
A priori, there would no reason to expect herding behavior by oil companies and
financial institutions that use the futures markets to hedge their (or their customers’) cash
positions.  Rather, we would expect changes in commercials' positions to reflect changes
in their underlying business, whether it be entering into agreements to make or take
future delivery of crude oil or petroleum products (in the case of oil companies), or
entering into swaps or adjusting hedge programs for customers (in the case of financial
institutions).
In constructing a correlation table of changes in commercials’ positions, we run into two
problems.  First, each correlation refers to a pair of traders, resulting in a large number of
correlations to be calculated – for n participants, there can be up to n(n-1)/2 correlations,
equal to 72010 in the case of crude oil, 38226 in the case of heating oil.
35
  Second, the
CFTC does not provide a useful industry breakdown for commercials – throwing them all
in the same pool might result in inaccurately small correlations as a result of comparing
participants who would be unlikely to come into contact with each other, much less herd.
Fortunately, Ederington and Lee [1998] provide an industry breakdown of the 40 largest
commercials that traded heating-oil during this period.  On this basis, I  calculated two
sets of position-change correlation matrices for heating-oil traders, one for oil companies
(24 participants), the other for financial institutions (16 participants).  I  also constructedSHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  24
correlation matrices for the same group of 40 in the crude oil futures market.
36
The results are shown in Table 5.  Not surprisingly, there is scant evidence of herding
among commercial participants in either the heating-oil or crude-oil futures markets.  The
average and median correlations are very close to zero, and differ from zero at
conventional significance levels only in the case of oil companies in crude futures.  All of
the roughly 200 correlations calculated in the two markets for financial institutions are
below 50%.  Of the nearly 500 correlations in the two markets calculated for oil
companies, only one exceeds 50%  -- the 79% correlation between two active traders
(one was active in the crude-oil futures market on 112  of the 962 days in the sample
period, the other on 218 days) is based on only 4 days when both were active.
{insert Table 5 about here}
Against this commercial benchmark I  compare the behavior of commodity-pool
operators in heating-oil futures, the group and market with the strongest evidence of
parallel behavior based on the count tests above.  During the sample period, there were
80 CPOs active in this market, but many were relatively small; the median number of
days in the market was 92.  Even among the ten largest (ranked by frequency of market
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These numbers represent upper bounds, because correlations can only be calculated when two traders’ are in the
market at the same time; i.e., their position-change dates overlap.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  25
participation), the median number of days in the market was 536, less than for the
commercials.  As a result, only about one third of the 3160 possible correlations among
CPO position changes can be calculated.
The results are consistent with those above (see Table 6).  CPOs as a group show a
statistically strong, although economically slight, tendency to herd.  The average
correlation was about 11 percent, versus zero for both oil companies and financial
institutions in the heating-oil market.  About one-quarter of the 1115 correlations
calculated exceed 25%; the top decile exceeds 50%, and the top 5 percent exceed 75
percent.  Only 382 (35 percent) of the correlations are negative.
{insert Table 6 about here}
The high correlations tend to be among the smaller players, however; when attention is
restricted to the largest 10 CPOs (measured by number of days active in the market), the
herding measures are weaker.  Only one of the 45 correlations among the top ten CPOs
exceeds 50 percent; only five exceed 30 percent.  The average and median correlations
are still statistically strong although economically slight, however, at 7.2 percent and 2.2
percent respectively. Three-quarters of the 45 correlations are positive.
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 While all 40 large commercial traders in heating-oil futures participated in crude-oil futures as well, four of them
(two from each group) were active on fewer than 10 days, and so had to be dropped from the calculations.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  26
IV. Conclusion
This paper has assessed the extent of speculator herding in a volatile international
commodity market – petroleum futures.  Employing both parametric (correlation) and
nonparametric (count) methods, I find little evidence of herding in heating-oil and crude-
oil futures markets among noncommercial traders as a group.  In contrast, there is solid
evidence of parallel position changes among a subgroup of speculators, commodity-fund
managers (CPOs).  The extent of parallelism is moderate economically, but statistically
highly significant at conventional levels (p-values much less than 1 percent).
Evidence of such behavior among floor participants is mixed, and depends on the
approach adopted; however, more work is needed to understand the factors behind these
results.    Overall, the data provide strong support for the monitoring/incentive theory of
herding behavior, and at best weak support for the asymmetric-information theory.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  27
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NYMEX futures contracts -- Aggregate statistics






1993 24869 8625 7408 45
1994 26812 8987 7471 45
1995 23614 8277 7072 50
1996 23488 8342 6312 54
1997 24771 8371 7475 40
Year-end Open Interest
1993 412 185 137 2
1994 354 133 53 3
1995 353 129 62 2
1996 364 95 60 3
1997 413 152 101 2
1. Other petroleum contracts traded 1993-1997 were propane and Gulf Coast unleaded gasoline.
TABLE 2 -- Reporting Traders: Breakdown by Type
Number of Traders Reporting
1 Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline Total
Commercial 380 277 276 479
Noncommercial
2 928 423 446 1213
Associated Person 4 5 2 6
Commodity Pool Operator 124 82 77 145
Commodity Trading Advisor 147 102 96 173
Floor Broker 128 73 80 167
Floor Trader 73 44 40 92
Futures Commission Merchant 40 26 18 51
Hedge Fund, Managed Money 133 95 86 151
Undesignated 549 196 232 750
Total 1308 700 722 1692
1.  Reporting thresholds: crude oil – 300 contracts, heating oil – 250, gasoline – 150.











CRUDE OIL HEATING OIL
mean 13.7 14.4 28.1
(6.8, 12.6)
48.7 8.6 8.6 17.2
(4.2, 8.6)
50.3
median 13 14 28
(7, 12)












1.  Days with the lowest percentage of large speculators buying were 26 July 1994 in crude-oil futures (3 of 23 active), and 19 September 1996 in
heating-oil futures (1 of 14 active).  The highest percentages of large speculators buying were recorded on 6 August 1993 in crude-oil futures (17 of
20), and 27 January 1997 for heating-oil futures (15 of 17).
TABLE 4 -- HERDING STATISTICS FOR NONCOMMERCIAL TRADERS
H (in percent)
1 CRUDE OIL HEATING OIL
All CPO FB&FT All CPO FB&FT
mean 1.20 3.24 [5.09] 1.11 [6.77] 0.86 3.86 [7.95] 1.78 [12.0]
standard deviation 0.22 0.47 [0.51] 0.30 [0.47] 0.26 0.60 [0.66] 0.39 [0.62]
p-value [percent] <0.01 <0.01 [<0.01] 0.03 [<0.01] 0.09 <0.01 [<0.01] <0.01 [<0.01]
median -0.06 1.04 [2.80] -0.47 [3.76] -0.47 2.99 [5.80] 0.26 [8.44]
days with H > 0 466 517 [524] 462 [572] 457 468 [517] 494 [658]
days with H < 0 496 428 [421] 500 [390] 505 383 [334] 468 [304]
p-value [percent] 17.5 0.21 [0.04] 11.6 [<0.01] 6.48 0.20 [<0.01] 21.0 [<0.01]
1. Figures in square brackets calculated assuming E[B/(B+S)] equals fraction of all active speculators (excluding subgroup tested) buying each day.
Other figures calculated assuming E[B/(B+S)] = 50 percent for all groups each day.Table 5 – Correlations among Commercial Players
Trading Group       Oil Companies   Financial Institutions
Market Crude Oil Heating Oil  Crude Oil Heating Oil
Participants 22 24 14 16
Median number of days active in market (out of 962 total)
640 913 556 741
Number of Correlations
maximum possible 231 276    91         120
actual 224 265              84         113
positive 132 146 49 58
negative   92 119 35 55
Average    1.9%   -0.2%   1.1% -0.3%
Standard deviation    0.7%    0.4%   1.6% 0.9%
Order statistics
Highest   78.8%   20.6% 38.1% 48.9%
95th percentile   17.2%    9.6% 25.8%  9.6%
90th percentile   11.6%    6.9% 13.0%  8.2%
Upper quartile    6.2%    3.5%   7.3%  3.9%
Median    1.3%    0.3%    0.7%  0.4%
Lower quartile   -2.8%   -3.3%    -3.1%   -4.6%
10th percentile  -9.0%   -7.4% -10.0% -10.2%
5th percentile -14.5% -12.0% -14.3% -15.6%
Lowest -33.3% -25.9% -81.3% -
38.0%
p-value (for zero median) 0.5% 5.5% 7.8% 42.5%SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  22
Table 6 – CPO herding in heating-oil futures
number of CPOs 80
maximum possible number of correlations 3160
all 80 largest 10
1
median # of reportable
days (out of 962 total)
92 536
number of correlations 1115 45
     positive 725 34
     negative 382 11
     zero 8 0
lowest -100 % -16.9%
5% -30.4% -8.0%
10% -17.4% -6.4%
lower quartile -3.5% 0.2%
median 4.7% 2.2%
upper quartile 24.9% 10.7%
90% 50.1% 32.2%
95% 76.2% 38.5%
highest 100 % 51.3%
p-value (for median = 0) <0.01 % 0.04%
average 10.9% 7.2%
standard deviation 3.0% 2.2%
p-value (for mean = 0)   0.03 % 0.25%
1. “Largest” defined by number of days active in the market.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  23
allowing us to estimate herding measures of two types.  The first type follows the small existing literature described above, and
measures the tendencies of market participants to make similar decisions (here correlation of changes in their positions in the oil
futures markets, and likelihood of buying when “the herd” is buying and selling when “the herd” is selling).  The second type
goes beyond the existing literature to separate out time periods when information about fundamentals flowing into the market is
great, and hence decisions are unlikely to be the outcome of herding behavior.SHEEP IN WOLVES’ CLOTHING? 01/31/00 PAGE  24
Table not used—summary statistics on speculators
total noncommercial actual theoreti
cal
absolute absolute absolute difference:
buyers sellers total percent percent difference difference observed - expected
active buying buying col S - Col T expected (col. U - col. V)
CRUDE OIL
mean 13.69 14.44 28.12 48.69% 8.86% 7.66% 1.20% mean
std. deviation prob(b=s) 0.0168
%
0.36% 0.2178% 0.2164% std. deviation
median 13 14 28 48.28% 7.32% 7.47% -0.06% median
maximum 32 31 50 85.00% 36.96% 12.30% 28.55% maximum
minimum 3 2 10 13.04% 0.00% 5.61% -10.47% minimum





mean 8.59 8.57 17.16 50.30% 10.90% 10.04% 0.86% mean
std. deviation prob(b=s) 88.105
2%
0.44% 0.2613% 0.2580% std.
deviation
median 8 8 17 50.00% 9.18% 9.82% -0.47% median
maximum 22 24 42 88.24% 42.86% 32.38% maximum
minimum 1 1 3 7.14% 0.00% -18.75% minimum
buyers as % of
active
50.06% 457 positive
505 negative